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Introduction
On October 28, 2015, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
Dispute Settlement Body adopted an Appellate Body report ruling on
China—HP-SSST.1 It concluded that Chinese antidumping duties,
imposed on high performance stainless steel seamless tubes (HPSSSTs), violated the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).2
The Appellate Body upheld the prior Panel decision and clarified requirements of national investigating authorities conducting antidumping injury analyses. WTO case law is notably underdeveloped regarding
dumping investigation injury procedures.3

1.

Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties
on High Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From
Japan, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From the European Union,
WTO Docs. WT/DS454/AB/R, WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted Oct. 28, 2015)
[hereinafter HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports].

2.

Id. at 104, 107; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1868
U.N.T.S 201 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]; General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].

3.

John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations Cases, Materials and Text 913 (6th ed. 2013) (“WTO case
law in [material injury investigations] is spotty.”).
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Steel is one product that is frequently subject to antidumping investigations.4 Likewise, Chinese exporters are often targets of antidumping
investigation.5 This is especially relevant to Chinese steel. The Chinese
steel industry has grown rapidly since 1978, when it was the world’s
fifth largest steel producer.6 Fast-forward twenty-eight years, China
dominated the world’s steel market. In 2006, it produced 400 million
tons.7 It currently produces more than any other country. In fact, China
churns out more steel than the United States, the European Union,
Russia, and Japan combined.8
Chinese steel is also relevant to how China treats steel imports.
China—HP-SSST involves an antidumping investigation conducted by
Chinese authorities to determine whether European and Japanese manufacturers were dumping HP-SSSTs in China. This case comment presents an overview of China—HP-SSST. It focuses on the current Chinese
injury analysis under WTO and Chinese law. Part I provides a brief
overview of WTO antidumping laws and injury analysis proceedings.
Part II summarizes the Appellate Body’s critical holdings in China—
HP-SSST. Part III concludes with a critique of the case’s key holding,
on price undercutting, and considers statistics about China as a respondent in antidumping cases.

I. Overview of Dumping Laws
Dumping is simple in theory but complex in application. It occurs
when a producer in one country exports goods and endeavors to sell

4.

Xiaochen Wu, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice of China 4 (2009)
(“The steel and chemical industries have been the principal focus of antidumping investigations around the world . . . .”).

5.

From January 1, 1995, to December 31, 2014, Chinese exports were subject
to 1,052 antidumping investigations throughout the world. This is more than
any other country during the period. The second closest was the Republic of
Korea, which was investigated 349 times. WTO, Anti-Dumping Initiations:
By Exporter 01/01/1995–31/12/2014, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByExpCty.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3JQNWTB] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).

6.

Wu, supra note 4, at 3–4 (“[I]n 1978, China’s total steel output was 31.78
million tons and ranked the world’s fifth largest. By 1996, China had become
the world’s largest steel producer, its output having reached 101.24 million
tons. In 2006, China’s steel output was more than 400 million tons.”).

7.

Id. at 4.

8.

Ivana Kottasova, China’s Slowdown is Killing Thousands of Steel Jobs,
CNN (Oct. 19, 2015, 1:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/19/news/
economy/china-slowdown-steel-jobs [https://perma.cc/2VES-JFW2] (“China
produces half of the world’s steel, more than the United States, European
Union, Russia and Japan combined.”).
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them in another country below normal value.9 The difference between
normal value and export price is called the dumping margin.10 The
GATT condemns dumping when it causes material injury to producers
in an importing country.11 In spite of condemnation, it is impossible for
WTO members to contest dumping before the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).12 Instead, members conduct self-directed dumping investigations.13
The Antidumping Agreement is a touchstone for investigation procedures. An affirmative dumping investigation presumes a determination of dumping and a determination of injury.14 Procedures are based
on the Antidumping Agreement, but vary by country.15 The United
States divides investigations between the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC).16 The
ITA accepts initial petitions to conduct dumping investigations.17 It
also directs determinations of dumping.18 The ITC directs determinations of injury.19 In China, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce
9.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1.

10.

The price of a good in its originating country is called its “normal value” (NV).
NV is compared to the good’s price in the importing country, which is called
“export price” (XP). Id. An investigating authority may substitute other
values for NV. For instance, it may compare the price of the good in a thirdparty country or the cost of production plus a reasonable amount for profit
with XP. Id. art. 2.2.

11.

GATT, supra note 2, art. VI.

12.

The Dispute Settlement Body governs and settles disputes tendered to the
WTO. It has the power to establish panels and to adopt panel and appellate
body reports referred by members. Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401. See also Daniel T. Shedd et al., Cong. Research Serv.,
RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization
(WTO): An Overview (2012) (discussing the WTO process for dispute
resolution among member nations).

13.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5.

14.

Id. arts. 2, 3.

15.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.141 (“Article 3 does not
prescribe a specific methodology to be relied on by an investigating authority
in its determination of injury.”).

16.

William J. Davey & John H. Jackson, Reform of the Administrative Procedures Used in U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 6 Admin.
L.J. Am. U. 399, 407 (1992).

17.

Id. at 408.

18.

Id. at 408–09.

19.

Id. at 408. For an extensive explanation of American dumping investigations,
see id. at 407–20.
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(MOFCOM) conducts both determinations of dumping and the determinations of injury.20
When determining dumping, an investigating authority calculates
Normal Value and Export Price.21 The difference between these variables is the dumping margin.22 A determination of injury relies on positive evidence and must achieve an objective examination.23 It focuses
on several elements that comprise an objective examination.24 The first
element is the volume of the dumped imports and “whether there has
been a significant increase in dumped imports.”25 The second element
is the effect of the dumped imports on the price of domestic goods.26
The final element is the overall impact of the dumped goods on the
domestic industry.27 While the Antidumping Agreement lists these
three factors as integral components of a balanced determination of
injury, it does not provide details on how they should be weighed to
deduce injury.28 In addition, the determination of injury presumes a
finding of causation. To find causation, an investigating authority must
eliminate nonattributing factors, forces other than dumping that cause
material injury to the relevant industry.29
If the investigating authority finds dumping, injury, and causation,
then it may impose an antidumping duty.30 Duties cannot exceed the

20.

For an extensive explanation of Chinese dumping investigations, see Wu,
supra note 4, at 145–74.

21.

See supra note 10.

22.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1.

23.

Positive evidence describes “the quality of the evidence that the investigating
authorities may rely on in making a determination, and requires the evidence
to be affirmative, objective verifiable, and credible.” HP-SSST Appellate Body
Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.138. An objective examination requires a determination of injury “conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith
and fundamental fairness” and be unbiased so that it does not favor any
interested party. Id.

24.

Id. ¶¶ 5.137–5.139; Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.1.

25.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.2.

26.

Id. arts. 3.1, 3.2.

27.

Id. arts. 3.1, 3.4.

28.

Id. art. 3.2 (“No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive
guidance.”).

29.

Id. art. 3.5 (“The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than
the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to
the dumped imports.”).

30.

GATT, supra note 2, art. VI.2.
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dumping margin.31 The goal of antidumping duties is to reduce market
distortions and allow all producers “an equal chance to compete.”32 If a
producer believes that an antidumping duty is wrongful, it must request
that its government seek corrective action before the WTO DSB.33

II. China—HP-SSST
China—HP-SSST began when MOFCOM conducted a dumping
investigation on HP-SSSTs imported from the European Union and
Japan.34 The contentious products—high-performance, stainless-steel
seamless tubes—are components in industrial boilers.35 MOFCOM investigated the normal value and export price of imported HP-SSSTs
between July 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011, and then evidence of injury
to the domestic industry between January 1, 2008, and June 30, 2011.36
It ultimately determined that Japan and the EU dumped HP-SSSTs
into the Chinese market, causing material injury, and then imposed an
antidumping duty, which European and Japanese manufacturers contested.37
Salzgitter Mannesmann Stainless Tubes and Tubacex Tubos
Inoxidables, S.A., from Europe, and Sumitomo Metal Industries and
Kobe Special Tube Co. Ltd., from Japan, (Complainants) petitioned

31.

Id. (“[A] contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping . . . .”).

32.

Jackson et al., supra note 3, at 831 (“The basic idea behind [unfair trade]
rules is sometimes expressed as a desire to create a level playing field where
the producers of the world all have an equal chance to compete.”).

33.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 17.

34.

See HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 1.4 (“China’s measure
at issue in these disputes are set forth in the Preliminary Determination and
Final Determination of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China (MOFCOM).”). The two Chinese HP-SSST producers that petitioned
MOFCOM to institute the dumping duty are Jiangsu Wujin Stainless Steel
Pipe Group Co., Ltd. and Changshu Walsin Specialty Steel Co., Ltd. Id. ¶
5.206 n.457.

35.

Id. ¶ 1.4 (“HP-SST is mainly used in the manufacture of pressurized components such as superheaters and reheaters of supercritical and ultrasupercritical boilers.”). Boilers produce energy in power plants. Id. ¶ 5.264
(quoting investigated Japanese exporters) (“[S]teel tubes used in ultrasupercritical power plant boilers . . . significantly outperform steel tubes used
in supercritical power plant boilers . . . .”).

36.

Id. ¶ 1.4 n.20 (“The period of investigation (POI) for the determination of
dumping was from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, and the POI for the determination of injury was from 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2011.”). See supra
note 10.

37.

Id. ¶¶ 1.2, 1.4, 1.5.
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their governments to initiate consultations with China.38 When consultations failed, the Complainants requested that the DSB convene a panel
to resolve the controversy.39 The Panel report held in favor of the Complainants, deciding that MOFCOM violated Article 3 of the Antidumping Agreement.40 It stopped short of holding that MOFCOM failed to
abide by Articles 3.1 and 3.2 in finding that Grade C imported tubes
had undercutting effects on domestic Grade C tubes.41 It also declined
the Complainants’ contention that MOFCOM improperly extended price findings pertaining to Grades B and C to domestic Grade A tubes.42
All three parties appealed.43 The DSB referred the report to the
Appellate Body, which issued a second report affirming and bolstering
the initial decision.44 The Appellate Body’s report addressed China’s
determination of injury extensively.45 MOFCOM’s injury procedures
incorporate the WTO rubric of Article 3 of the Antidumping Agreement.46 The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China implement requisite aspects of the Antidumping Agreement.47 In
38.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1. Consultations are the first
step of a dispute before requesting the DSB convene a panel. GATT, supra
note 2, art. XXII.

39.

Panel Reports, China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High
Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From Japan,
China—Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High Performance
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) From the European Union,
¶¶ 1.2, 1.3, WTO Docs. WT/DS454/R, WT/DS460/R (adopted Feb. 14,
2015) [hereinafter HP-SSST Panel Reports]. As many issues raised by Japan
and the EU overlapped, the Panel (and later the Appellate Body) consolidated
both cases into a single report.

40.

Id. ¶ 7.144.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.

44.

Id. ¶ 5.5.3.2.

45.

This case comment focuses on issues relating to the Appellate Body’s
rulings on MOFCOM’s injury determination. It does not include any discussion on whether MOFCOM correctly calculated normal value, whether
it improperly withheld essential facts about its determination of dumping,
or whether MOFCOM’s procedures failed to protect business confidential
information.

46.

Zhōng Huá Rén Mín Gòng Hé Guó Fǎn Qīng Xiāo Tiáo Lì (中华人民共和国
反倾销条例) [Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the St. Council P.R.C., Nov. 26, 2001, amended Mar. 31,
2004, effective Feb. 17, 2005) Ministry of Commerce, at art. 8, http://english.
mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/200502/200502000
17435.html [https://perma.cc/W7HN-LU9V].

47.

Id.

894

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016
China—HP-SSST and Price Undercutting

addition, MOFCOM issues Provisions on Industry Injury Investigation
for Anti-Dumping, detailing how MOFCOM deduces injury.48 A determination of injury proceeds according to Article 3.1 of the Antidumping
Agreement. The Chinese determination of injury begins by ascertaining
domestic-like products.49 In China—HP-SSST, HP-SSSTs included
three grades of tubes Grade A, B, and C.50 The Complainants contested
MOFCOM’s material injury conclusions.51
The Appellate Body report begins by establishing precedent.52 It
recognizes that Article 3 paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 create a “logical progression” for every determination of injury.53 The logical progression is a gradual process where one conclusion informs the next.54 Each
interlocked step builds on the last, leading to a determination on whether the domestic industry suffered material injury.55 For instance, the
outcome regarding whether dumped goods have a price effect must
serve as a “meaningful basis” for a national investigator to assess the

48.

Wu, supra note 4, at 405–11.

49.

Id. at 85–89.

50.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.179 (“MOFCOM
defined the domestic like product as certain HP-SSST, encompassing three
product types or grades referred to by the Panel as Grades A, B, and C.”).
Grade A tubes are the least expensive, and Grade C tubes are the most
expensive. Id. ¶ 5.181 (“Grade B is approximately double the price of Grade
A, and Grade C is approximately triple the price of Grade A.”). The Chinese
domestic industry was defined as two producers. HP-SSST Panel Reports,
supra note 38, ¶ 7.153 (“MOFCOM defined the domestic industry as
comprising two domestic producers accounting for a majority proportion of
total domestic production of the domestic product like the subject imports.”).

51.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.136–5.298. China
defines material injury as “actually caused and non-negligible injuries to
domestic industries.” Wu, supra note 4, at 406.

52.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5.136–.142.

53.

Id. ¶ 5.140.

54.

Id. ¶¶ 5.140, 5.162 (“Article 3 thus contemplates a ‘logical progression’ in
the investigating authority’s examination leading to an ultimate determination of whether dumped imports are causing material injury to the domestic
industry . . . . A proper assessment of price effects under Article 3.2 is, therefore, a necessary building block for the ultimate determination of injury.”).

55.

Id. ¶ 5.141 (“Nor is there a prescribed template or format that an investigating authority must adhere to in making its determination of injury, provided
that its determination comports with the disciplines that apply under the
discrete paragraphs of Article 3. These disciplines are necessary, interlinked
elements of a single, overall analysis addressing the question of whether
dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry.”).
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relationship between the price of dumped goods and the state of the
domestic industry.56
A. Price Undercutting

The Complainants contested the Panel’s interpretation of price
undercutting. Japan renewed the argument that MOFCOM’s method
for finding price undercutting, where it merely found imported tube
prices were mathematically lower than domestic tube prices, was inadequate because it failed to produce information about the effect of the
dumped imports on domestic prices.57 The EU added that a simple comparison of prices over a single year must be combined with other relevant facts, such as “inverse price movements, a sudden and substantial
increase in the domestic prices, an increase in the market share of domestic . . . products, and an absence of substitutability.”58 These considerations are all helpful in explaining the effect of dumped goods on
domestic products.59 The Appellate Body agreed. It reversed the Panel,
and held that price undercutting investigations must do more than
merely compare prices, they must compare prices over time.60 Such an
examination reveals price movements and “trends in the relationship
between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic like
products.”61 The Appellate Body essentially found a violation because
MOFCOM did not consider why prices for imported tubes were lower,
only that they were objectively lower.
The Appellate Body also fleshed out the word “significant.”62 It
explained that whether price undercutting is significant depends on “the

56.

Id. ¶ 5.162 (“[T]he outcome of the price effects inquiry . . . must be one that
enables the investigating authority to advance its analysis so as to serve as
a meaningful basis for its determination as to whether subject imports, through
such price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry.”).

57.

Id. ¶ 5.151.

58.

Id. ¶ 5.152.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. ¶ 5.159.

61.

Id. (“[A] proper reading of ‘price undercutting’ . . . suggests that the inquiry
requires a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic
like products over the entire period of investigation (POI).”). Id. ¶ 5.160
(“[D]ynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the relationship
between the prices of the dumped imports and those of domestic like products
over the duration of the POI.”).

62.

Id. ¶¶ 5.154–.155. The relevant text of Article 3.2 of the Antidumping Agreement reads “whether there has been a ‘significant price undercutting’ by the
dumped imports.” Id. ¶ 5.155.
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circumstances of each case.”63 Indicators that price undercutting is significant include “the nature of the product . . . how long the price undercutting has been taking place and to what extent, and . . . the
relative market shares of the product types with respect to which the
authority has made a finding of price undercutting.”64 The relevant indicators, however, will vary from case to case.
In addition, the EU argued that MOFCOM incorrectly applied the
result of the price effect evaluation to the entire domestic HP-SSST
industry because the domestic industry mainly produces Grade A
tubes.65 The EU further argued that while foreign producers manufacture Grades B and C, any price effect on these grades in the domestic
market is not indicative of a significant effect on the entire industry
because the industry mainly produces Grade A tubes.66 Although the
Appellate Body confirmed that MOFCOM was not required to prove
price undercutting for each grade, it agreed with the EU’s argument,
holding that investigating authorities are required to craft results in a
way that “provide[s] a meaningful basis for subsequently determining
whether the dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic
industry.”67 Such a procedure assumes that the agency will “tak[e] into
account . . . the relative market share of each product type.”68 Therefore, MOFCOM’s application of price effects from two grades to the
entire market was deceiving. In fact, there was only price undercutting
to the segment of the Chinese market that produced Grade B and C
tubes, which did not constitute a majority of the Chinese market.69
B. Impact Analysis

The Complainants also appealed the Panel’s decision on MOFCOM’s impact analysis. Article 3.4 describes the purpose of an impact
analysis; it is a method for assessing the effects of dumping and the
state of the domestic industry.70 The Antidumping Agreement also lists
economic indices for an investigating authority to consider in evaluating
63.

Id. ¶ 5.161 (“What amounts to significant price undercutting—that is,
whether the undercutting is important, notable, or consequential—will therefore necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case.”).

64.

Id.

65.

Id. ¶ 5.177.

66.

Id.; HP-SSST Panel Reports, supra note 42, ¶ 7.182 n.324 (“China concedes
that the ‘majority’ of domestic production concerned Grade A products.”).

67.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.180.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. ¶ 5.181.

70.

Id. ¶ 5.204 (“[T]he focus of Article 3.4 is on the state of the domestic
industry.”).
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the impact.71 Investigating authorities must assess each factor for an
impact analysis to comply with WTO law.72 The DSB also held that
investigating authorities must explain in their final report which factors
they deem relevant, which factors they consider irrelevant, and why.73
The Complainants’ argument was that MOFCOM should have
applied results gleaned in volume and price effect examinations toward
its impact analysis on a segmented basis.74 In other words, MOFCOM’s
failure to find patterns in volume and affirmative price effects for
Grades B and C tubes only could only have impacted the Chinese market for Grade B and C tubes.75 It was, therefore, inappropriate for MOFCOM to evaluate the impact on the entire industry. The domestic
market primarily produced Grade A tubes, but importers mostly produced Grade B and C tubes. Since market share is a factor in Article
3.4, the Appellate Body found that market share was relevant as a filter
for applying MOFCOM’s previous findings in the volume and price
portions of the investigation.76
The Appellate Body, again, reversed the Panel decision. It declared
that the logical progression that runs throughout Article 3 applies to
71.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.4 (“The examination of the
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall
include . . . actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting
domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability
to raise capital or investments.”). China codified the factors in Article 7 of
MOFCOM’s Provisions on Industry Injury Investigation for Anti-Dumping
Injury. Wu, supra note 4, at 406 (“The examination . . . shall cover the evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices affecting the situations of
domestic industries, including sale, profits, amount of production, market
share, productivity, investment/profit situation or the existing actual or
potential decrease in equipment utilization rate; the factors affecting the
domestic prices; the margin of dumping; and the actual or potential negative
affects on cash flow, stocks, employment, salary, industrial increase, or capability in fund raising or investment.”).

72.

Panel Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports
of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, ¶ 6.159, WTO Doc. WT/DS141/R
(adopted Oct. 30, 2000) (“[E]ach of the fifteen factors listed in Art. 3.4 of
the AD Agreement must be evaluated by the investigating authorities in
each case in examining the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned.”).

73.

Id. ¶ 6.162 (“[E]very factor in Article 3.4 must be considered, and that the
nature of this consideration, including whether the investigating authority
considered the factor relevant in its analysis of the impact of dumped imports
on the domestic industry, must be apparent in the final determination.”).

74.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 5.195.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. ¶ 5.207.
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Article 3.4. The Panel found that the logical progression only applied
to changes in volume, price, and findings of causation, relying on the
belief that volume and price should be linked to dumping through causation.77 It assumed that price and volume are relevant to causation and
need not be relevant to an impact analysis.78 The Appellate Body
determined, conversely, that volume and price should be considered in
an impact analysis, reasoning that such an analysis is for the purpose
of “understanding . . . the impact of subject imports on the basis of
[volume and price].”79 Ultimately, the value in Article 3’s logical
progression is that it exposes “the relationship between subject imports
and the state of the domestic industry.”80 A logical progression encompasses Articles 3.2 and 3.4 in finding injury and ultimately that dumping caused material injury to the domestic industry.81
The Appellate Body continued by confirming that it was proper for
MOFCOM to evaluate the impact of imported goods on the state of
the industry.82 It was not proper for MOFCOM to not take into account
the market shares of the segments of the product where it has found an
impact.83 In other words the impact should be limited to the grade of a
product where an effect is found.
C. Causation

China appealed the Panel’s findings on causation. A causation
analysis ties dumping to an injury determination.84 Investigating authorities must base their causation findings on “all relevant evidence,”
including information developed by assessing the factors in Articles 3.1,
3.2, and 3.4.85 Investigating authorities must also eliminate nonattribution factors at this stage.86 In short, governed by Article 3.5, national
77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. ¶ 5.205 (quoting Appellate Body Report, China—Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the
United States, ¶ 149, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Nov. 16, 2012)).

80.

Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report, China—Countervailing and AntiDumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the
United States, ¶ 149, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Nov. 16, 2012)).

81.

Id. ¶ 5.209.

82.

Id. ¶ 5.210.

83.

Id. ¶ 5.211.

84.

Antidumping Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.5 (“It must be demonstrated
that the dumped imports are . . . causing injury . . . .”).

85.

Id. (“The demonstration of a causal relationship . . . shall be based on an
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities.”).

86.

Id. (“The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the
dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry,

899

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016
China—HP-SSST and Price Undercutting

investigators must devise a framework for reaching a conclusion on
causation.
The Appellate Body rejected all of China’s arguments.87 MOFCOM
began by contesting the Panel’s findings. It argued that the Panel failed
to conduct an “objective assessment” of the case.88 MOFCOM’s first
argument contended that China acknowledged that imported HPSSSTs constituted a large market share, even after declining from a
nearly ninety percent to a fifty percent market share, and that the
Panel should not have ignored that consideration.89 Because China acknowledged the decrease, but maintained that the market of imported
goods was still high, such a finding was consistent with its obligations
to account for a downward trend.90 The Appellate Body disagreed,
affirming the Panel. The Appellate Body held that MOFCOM was required to ascertain a reason for the declining market share so that it
could reasonably consider whether price effects were attenuated on the
entire industry.91 This was necessary before concluding that there was
causation between price effects and domestic tubes.92
Next, China argued that it correctly assumed there was a price
correlation between imported Grade B and C tubes and domestic Grade
A tubes. Relying on the assumption that cross-grade price effects are
implicit, China claimed that imported Grade B and C tubes had a negative cross-grade price effect on the price of Grade A tubes, even though
the Grade A tube market was almost completely composed of Chinese
manufacturers.93 Because cross-grade price effects always exist between
different grades of a product, China, allegedly, did not have to support
its conclusion with evidence.94 The Appellate Body rejected the second
argument too, finding that countries must find cross-grade price correlations, based on objective evidence.95 Once a country confirms that such
a correlation exists, it must tease out the impact of the correlation.

and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the
dumped imports.”).
87.

HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note 1, ¶ 6.

88.

Id. ¶¶ 5.214, 5.244.

89.

Id. ¶ 5.247.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. ¶ 5.248.

92.

Id. ¶¶ 5.248–50.

93.

Id. ¶¶ 5.216, 5.252.

94.

Id. ¶ 5.256.

95.

Id.
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Thirdly, China contended that high-grade tubes are substitutes for
low-grade tubes.96 For example, Grade B and C tubes may be used in
place of Grade A tubes. The Appellate Body disagreed again.97 It emphasized that Grade B and C tubes are more expensive than Grade A.98
Moreover, only Grade B and C tubes are suitable to be used in “ultrasupercritical boilers.”99 Grade A tubes are inferior in quality and are
only suitable in boilers that generate power under lower pressure.100 In
order to prove this claim, a respondent must investigate the extent of
substitution between grades.101
Regardless of the Appellate Body’s ruling on each issue, China’s
appeal on causation fails because it relied on insufficient findings of
price undercutting and impact on the domestic market. As part of the
logical progression of Article 3, of the Antidumping Agreement, the
causation findings were premised on faulty conclusions and ultimately
unsubstantiated.

Conclusion
The Appellate Body’s affirmation in this case presents an interesting trend apparent in antidumping cases against China. According to
work by Professor Juscelino Colares, there is a perceivable trend of bias
against respondents in DSB proceedings.102 According to the positive
theory of litigation, court decisions should equally favor complainants

96.

Id. ¶ 5.252.

97.

Id. ¶ 5.263.

98.

Id. ¶ 5.181 (“Grade B is approximately double the price of Grade A, and
Grade C is approximately triple the price of Grade A.”).

99.

Id. ¶ 5.263.

100. Id. (“[H]igher-grade products B and C are capable of enduring the greater
pressures and temperatures produced in ultra-supercritical boilers, and that
the lower-grade product A is used in lower pressure and temperate environments in supercritical boilers.”).
101. Id. (“Given the considerable price and physical differences between the
different product grades at issue, MOFCOM should, at the very least, have
assessed the existence and the extent of substitutability of lower- and higherend HP-SSST in order to show that ‘alleged substitutability demonstrates
price correlation’ between each product type.”).
102. Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical
Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 383, 439
(2009) (“The existence of a sustained pattern of Complainant success, with
win rates ranging from 83% to 91% across Case Types, constitutes a substantial deviation from the 50% success rate predicted under random litigation
assumptions.”).
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and respondents.103 WTO members have brought antidumping cases
against China on seven occasions and five have survived consultations.104 China has lost all five of these cases, as a respondent.105 While
five cases is not a statistically significant number to prove bias, it adheres to the general theory.
In the 1980s, years before China joined the WTO on December 11,
2001, the US, the EU, Canada, and Australia brought the most antidumping cases.106 Now, the top five implementers of antidumping measures include India, Argentina, Turkey, and China.107 MOFCOM, between January 1995 and December 2014, conducted 218 antidumping
investigations and imposed 176 antidumping duties.108 Approximately
80.7% of cases led to antidumping duties. That percentage is high. Of
India, Argentina and Turkey, only Turkey is higher (approx. 90.6%).109
Although the Appellate Body report and the Panel report had the
same outcome, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s holdings on
price undercutting and MOFCOM’s impact analysis. At least one expert suggests that China—HP-SSST raises the bar for investigating

103. Id. at 385 (“[T[he prevailing positive theory of judicial adjudication explains
that it is unlikely for a particular type of litigant to systematically prevail over
time because stronger cases will settle rather than result in full adjudication.”).
104. Umair H. Ghori, The Dumping Dragon: Analysing China’s Evolving AntiDumping Behaviour, 4 Bus. & Mgmt. Rev. 114, 119 tbl.4 (2013). The seven
cases treat the Japanese and EU HP-SSST case as one. The number also
updates Table 4 with one additional case since Ghori’s paper was published.
Request for Consultations by Canada, China—Anti-Dumping Measures on
Imports of Cellulose Pulp from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS483/1 (adopted
Oct. 20, 2014).
105. Ghori, supra note 104, at 119; HP-SSST Appellate Body Reports, supra note
1, ¶ 6.2.
106. Jackson et al., supra note 3, at 836–37 (“[I]n the 1980s . . . four countries—
the US, the EU, Canada and Australia were by far the major users of AD
measures. . . . [S]ince 1995, the major users of AD laws are (in order): India,
the US, the US, the EU, Argentina, China and Turkey.”).
107. Id.
108. WTO, Anti-Dumping Initiatives: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995–
31/12/2014, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_Initiation
sByRepMem.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8QT-UN7A] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016)
[hereinafter WTO, By Reporting Member]; WTO, Anti-Dumping
Measures: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995–31/12/2014, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XSV6-38G8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter WTO,
Anti-Dumping Measures].
109. WTO, Anti-Dumping Measures, supra note 108; WTO, By Reporting
Member, supra note 108. India and Argentina both impose duties in approximately 72.2% of cases. It is also much higher than the US (65.46%), the EU
(63.68%), and Canada (60.7%).
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authorities implementing antidumping duties.110 The price undercutting
procedures appear particularly suspect. Rajib Pal, of Sidley Austin
Washington, D.C., proposes three hypothetical scenarios when there
appears to be dumping, but the holding of China—HP-SSST may impede an injury finding: first, when import and domestic prices fluctuate
each quarter; second when import prices are above domestic prices, then
domestic prices increase and remain higher for an equivalent period of
time; third, when import prices are above domestic prices, then import
prices decrease so that they fall below domestic prices.111 Pal explains
that the ITC counts the yearly quarters for each good, then finds
dumping if import prices exceed domestic prices for a greater number
of quarters. He argues that China—HP-SSST places a greater burden
on investigating authorities in the first two scenarios because dumping
is most apparent when import prices dip below domestic prices.112
The second scenarios create a troubling outcome. An importing
manufacturer can theoretically continue to dump goods without being
identified by a price undercutting analysis. If a company wishes to
dump, it could wait until prices in the foreign market increase, then by
merely keeping its prices constant it could essentially dump its goods
without being suspected. Given this observation the Appellate Body’s
holding is restrictive and in at least one way ineffectual.
There are also benefits of the new price undercutting requirements.
The goal of Article 3.2 is to identify when the price of dumped foreign
goods affects the price of domestic goods. While the three hypotheticals
are helpful in considering American trade policy, they also demonstrate
that the United States also failed to recognize the Appellate Body’s
understanding of price undercutting. Instead of merely comparing prices
in different quarters and counting the number of times one price is
higher than the other, it is important to identify trends. If an
investigating authority can identify patterns, then it can understand
whether there is any actual effect on the industry. For future antidumping investigations price-undercutting assessments must evolve so that
they can more concretely contribute to a finding of injury on a domestic
industry.
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